Abstract:
This article, through a critical analysis of the Indian Supreme Court’s decision in Disortho S.A.S. v. Meril Life Sciences Pvt. Ltd., identifies the flawed application of fundamental arbitration principles. The judgment—delivered by a three-judge bench led by then Chief Justice Sanjiv Khanna—assumed jurisdiction under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, despite the arbitration agreement providing for institutional arbitration seated in Bogotá D.C., Colombia. This article observes the Court’s conflation of key arbitration concepts such as lex arbitri, the law governing the arbitration agreement, and procedural rules, and reveals a doctrinal misunderstanding of well-settled international arbitration principles. The article critiques the Court’s interpretation of conflicting clauses, failure to defer to the designated arbitral institution, failure to refer to previous relevant judgments and unnecessary application of the Enka judgment, which improperly lead it to extend Part I of the Indian Arbitration Act to cases involving foreign seats. It concludes that the judgment represents a significant setback to the evolution of a coherent arbitration regime in India and calls for greater doctrinal clarity in matters involving international arbitration, particularly as one judgment could have a watershed effect on future precedents.

Keywords: International Commercial Arbitration, Section 11 Jurisdiction,Lex Arbitri and Seat of Arbitration, Institutional Arbitration, Indian Arbitration Law

Cite this as: Chirag Balyan and Yukta Tahiliani , “Arbitration Fundamentals Astray: A Critical Analysis of Indian Supreme Court Decision in Disortho S.A.S. v. Meril Life Sciences” 5 IRIArb (2025).

*The views expressed are of author(s) only.

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